While a large social-choice-theoretic literature discusses the aggregation of individual judgments into collective ones, there is relatively little formal work on the transformation of individual judgments in group deliberation. I develop a model of judgment transformation and prove a baseline impossibility result: Any judgment transformation function satisfying some initially plausible conditions is the identity function, under which no opinion change occurs. I identify escape routes from this impossibility result and argue that successful group deliberation must be 'holistic': individuals cannot generally revise their judgments on a proposition based on judgments on that proposition alone but must take other propositions into account too.
Introduction
Aggregation and deliberation are often contrasted as two very di¤erent approaches to collective decision-making. While aggregation is the merging of con ‡icting individual opinions into a social outcome, deliberation involves the discussion of these opinions and their possible revision by the individuals deliberating.
1 Jon Elster (1986, p. 112) summarizes the di¤erence between the two approaches as follows: 'The core of the [deliberative approach] ... is that rather than aggregating or …ltering preferences, the political system should be set up with a view to changing them by public debate and confrontation.' He continues, 'there would [then] not be any need for an aggregation mechanism, since a rational discussion would tend to produce unanimous preferences.'
The contrast between the two approaches is probably overstated. More plausibly, they are complementary rather than contradictory, with deliberation often preceding aggregation (Miller 1992 , Knight and Johnson 1994 , Dryzek and List 2003 . Nonetheless, social choice theory, arguably our best formal theory of collective decision-making, has focused mostly on aggre- I model opinions as judgments -acceptance or rejection -on certain propositions, drawing on the emerging theory of judgment aggregation. 2 The 1 On deliberative democracy, see, for example, Cohen (1989) , Dryzek (1990 Dryzek ( , 2000 , Fishkin (1991) , Gutman and Thompson (1996) , Bohman and Rehg (1997) . 2 Inspired by the 'doctrinal' and 'discursive' paradoxes (Kornhauser and Sager 1986, Pettit 2001) , judgment aggregation was formalized by Pettit (2002, 2004) , combining Arrow's (1951 Arrow's ( /1963 ) axiomatic approach to social choice theory with a logical representation of propositions. Further results and model extensions were provided by List (2003 List ( , 2004 , Pauly and van Hees (2006) , Dietrich (2006, forthcoming) , Nehring and propositions may be logically interconnected, so that the judgments on some propositions constrain those that can rationally be held on others. This way of modelling opinions is very general. As illustrated below, it can represent not only beliefs but also preferences. While the theory of judgment aggre- To develop an axiomatic approach to studying judgment transformation, I present a baseline impossibility result. It shows that, when the propositions under consideration are non-trivially interconnected, any judgment transformation function satisfying some initially plausible conditions must be maximally conservative: it must be the identity function, under which nobody ever changes his or her judgment on anything. The conditions, informally stated, are the following. First, any pro…le of rational individual judgment sets is admissible as input to the deliberation (universal domain). Second, the output of the deliberation is also a pro…le of rational individual judgment sets (rational co-domain). Third, if there is unanimity on every proposition before deliberation (not just on a single one), this is preserved after deliberation (unanimity preservation); fourth, the individuals do not always ignore their pre-deliberation judgments in forming their post-deliberation judgments Puppe (2005) , van Hees (forthcoming), Dietrich and List (forthcoming a, b) , Dokow and Holzman (2005) and Pigozzi (2006) . Judgment aggregation theory is closely related to abstract aggregation theory, e.g., Wilson (1975) , Fishburn (1986), Nehring and Puppe (2002) , and to the theory of belief merging (Konieczny and Pino Pérez 2002) .
(minimal relevance); and …fth, the deliberation focuses on one proposition at a time (independence/systematicity).
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Since only a degenerate deliberative process in which there is no opinion change satis…es these …ve conditions together, I consider relaxing some of them so as to avoid this negative result. I argue that, except in special cases, the …rst four conditions are hard to give up, but that the …fth -independence/systematicity -is a plausible candidate for relaxation. Thus the impossibility result shows that successful group deliberation as envisaged by deliberative democrats requires some kind of holism: individuals cannot generally revise their judgments on each proposition based on judgments on that proposition alone. The revision must take judgments on other propositions into account too. I give some examples of feasible judgment transformation functions, distinguishing between those that generate consensus and those that generate something less than consensus.
Throughout the paper, I relate my approach to other works on the intersection between social choice theory and deliberative democracy. Other important related contributions include the Alchourrón-Gärdenfors-Makinson theory of belief revision (1985) , whose focus, however, is on a single individual's belief change in response to new information rather than belief revision in groups, and the theory of conciliation and consensus in belief merging (Konieczny 2004; Gauwin, Konieczny and Marquis 2005) , whose key concept -a conciliation operator -is formally related to the present concept of a judgment transformation function. I conclude with a brief discussion of how the present work is related to game-theoretic works on deliberation.
3 Systematicity adds to this a neutrality requirement, as formally de…ned below.
Opinions as judgments on propositions
How can the opinions held by a group of individuals at a given time be modelled? In this section, I explain how to model them as judgments on propositions expressed in logic (following List and Pettit 2002 and Dietrich forthcoming) . I turn to their aggregation and transformation subsequently.
The ingredients of the model are the following. There is a group of individuals, labelled 1; 2; :::; n. Each individual's opinions (at a given time) are represented by a judgment set: the set of all those propositions in the agenda that the individual accepts. 6 On the standard interpretation, to accept proposition 'p'means to believe 'p'; thus judgments are binary cognitive attitudes. (Alternatively, to accept 'p'could mean to desire 'p'; judgments would then be binary emotive 4 Formally, the agenda is a subset X of the logic, where (i) X is closed under negation (if 'p'is in X, then so is 'not p'), (ii) 'not not p'is identi…ed with 'p', and (iii) X contains no tautological or contradictory propositions. Instead of propositional logic, any logic with some minimal properties can be used, including expressively richer logics such as predicate, modal, deontic and conditional logics (Dietrich forthcoming). 5 In propositional logic, a set of propositions is consistent if all its members can be simultaneously true, and inconsistent otherwise. For example, f'a', 'a or b'g is a consistent set, whereas f'a', 'not a'g and f'a', 'if a then b', 'not b'g are not. More generally, consistency is de…nable in terms of a more basic notion of logical entailment (Dietrich forthcoming). 6 Formally, individual i's judgment set is a subset J i of the agenda X.
attitudes.) A judgment set is consistent if it is a consistent set of propositions and complete if it contains a member of each proposition-negation pair in the agenda. A combination of judgment sets across all the individuals in the group is called a pro…le.
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Let me give some examples of agendas of propositions on which groups of individuals may make judgments. Dietrich and List (forthcoming-a) , drawing on List and Pettit (2004) . 11 The conjunction of the propositions in quotes is stipulated to be false and their disjunction to be true. The example is due to Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) . 12 Formally, I assume that (i) the agenda has an inconsistent subset of three or more propositions that becomes consistent upon removing one or more propositions, and (ii) it is not (nor isomorphic to) a set of propositions whose only logical connectives are 'not'and (ii). In examples 2 to 4, a further property is met, which I assume only where explicitly stated: (iii) any proposition in the agenda can be deduced from any other proposition in it via a sequence of pairwise conditional entailments (Nehring and Puppe 2002) .
The aggregation of judgments
Before I formally de…ne the problem of judgment transformation, it is useful to recapitulate the problem of judgment aggregation: How can each pro…le of individual judgment sets on a given agenda be aggregated into a collective judgment set? This problem arises, for example, in referenda involving multiple propositions, in legislatures or committees deciding what factual and normative propositions to accept in legislation, in multi-member courts resolving cases on the basis of several premises, and in expert panels seeking to merge several scienti…c viewpoints into a collective viewpoint.
As illustrated in Figure 1 , an aggregation function is a function that maps each pro…le of individual judgment sets in some domain to a collective judgment set. if it also meets property (iii), independence is enough.
to the example of ranking candidates or options (example 3 above), Arrow's impossibility theorem (1951/1963 ) on preference aggregation can be shown to be a corollary.
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Obviously, a lot could be said about how to interpret the result. To avoid the dictatorship conclusion, we must relax one of universal domain, collective rationality, unanimity preservation or independence/systematicity.
All these routes have been discussed extensively in the literature. Arguably, the relaxation of universal domain and of independence/systematicity are the most promising routes. Since the focus of this paper is on deliberation rather than aggregation, however, I set these issues aside here and return to analogous issues in the discussion of judgment transformation. Theorem 1 su¢ ces to illustrate that, under conditions of pluralism, the aggregation of individual judgments into collective ones raises a signi…cant, albeit not insurmountable, challenge.
The transformation of judgments
To model the transformation (as opposed to aggregation) of judgments, only one further concept is needed: that of a judgment transformation function.
As illustrated in Figure 2 , a transformation function is a function that maps each pro…le of individual judgment sets in some domain to a pro…le of individual judgment sets in some co-domain (possibly the same as the domain).
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The input pro…le represents the individuals'judgments before deliberation, the output pro…le their judgments after deliberation. The output judgments may or may not di¤er from the input judgments, and the transformation may or may not lead to consensus.
Figure 2: Judgment transformation
A simple example of a transformation function is deference to the majority, where, after deliberation, each individual accepts all those propositions that a majority accepts before deliberation. But just as majority voting as an aggregation function fails to guarantee consistent collective judgments, so deference to the majority as a transformation function fails to guarantee consistent post-deliberation judgments (Pettit 2006) . If each expert in the climate change example were to defer to the majority judgments in Table 1, for instance, the resulting post-deliberation judgments would be inconsistent.
An alternative to deference to the majority is deference to a supermajority or unanimity: here each individual accepts all those propositions after deliberation that a certain quali…ed majority (perhaps everyone) accepts before deliberation. If the supermajority threshold is su¢ ciently large, such a transformation function performs better than deference to a majority at securing consistency (List 2006b ), but it has problems of its own. First, the individuals'post-deliberation judgments will be incomplete on all those issues on which there is no supermajority consensus; and second, they may Universal domain requires the transformation function to cope with conditions of pluralism on the input side, subject to the constraint of full individual rationality. A more demanding input condition would require the transformation function to cope even with less than fully rational individual judgments; but the main result below shows that even the present requirement is far from undemanding.
Rational co-domain. The transformation function produces as output a pro…le of consistent and complete individual judgment sets.
Rational co-domain requires the transformation function to produce output pro…les that also meet the constraint of full individual rationality. Below I also consider a weaker variant of this requirement.
Unanimity preservation. The transformation function maps any unanimous pro…le to itself.
Unanimity preservation requires that, if the individuals agree on all propositions on the agenda before deliberation, this all-way consensus be preserved after deliberation. This is distinct from either of the following, arguably less plausible conditions. The …rst is unanimity generation, the requirement that the transformation function map every pro…le to a unanimous pro…le, as captured by Elster's quote in the introduction to this paper. Although endorsed by many deliberative democrats, especially those of a Habermasian orientation, this requirement seems unduly demanding and empirically unrealistic. The second condition from which unanimity preservation is distinct is propositionwise unanimity preservation, the requirement that if all individuals agree on a particular proposition 'p' before deliberation, without necessarily agreeing on other propositions, this consensus on 'p'be preserved after deliberation. This requires that even an incompletely theorized agreement on 'p'be preserved in deliberation, even if di¤erent individuals agree on 'p'for incompatible reasons. Such a requirement is neither normatively compelling nor empirically realistic. 17 For example, upon noticing that you and I support 'p' for incompatible reasons, we may each decide to give up our belief in 'p'. By contrast, unanimity preservation is the much milder requirement that an all-way consensus on everything -in those rare cases in which it occurs -be stable under deliberation.
To state the next condition, call two pro…les variants for a given individual if they coincide for all individuals except the given one.
17 On incompletely theorized agreements, see Sunstein (1994) 19 Again, if the agenda meets only properties (i) and (ii), systematicity is needed for the result; if it also meets property (iii), independence is enough. 20 The quali…cations regarding independence and systematicity in the footnote to Theorem 1 apply here too and thus carry over to Theorem 2.
This completes the proof.
Theorem 2 is clearly an impossibility result, showing that 'successful' group deliberation is impossible under the given conditions. The result casts doubt on these conditions. First, from a normative perspective, one does not want to impose conditions on deliberation that are so restrictive as to be met only by a degenerate deliberative process in which nobody ever changes his or her judgments. This would obviously be against the spirit of the normative literature on deliberative democracy. Further, Theorem 2 immediately implies that the …ve introduced conditions are inconsistent with the further condition of unanimity generation discussed above and implicit in many writings on deliberative democracy, as illustrated by Elster's opening quote. Therefore, if one did want deliberation to produce unanimity, one could not also expect it to meet the …ve introduced conditions.
Secondly, from an empirical perspective, it is simply not true that group deliberation exhibits the extreme conservatism implied by the theorem. There is plenty of empirical evidence that opinions do change in deliberation; more on this later. Let me therefore go through the conditions one by one and consider relaxing them.
6 Escape routes
Relaxing universal domain
Universal domain requires the transformation function to cope with any level of pluralism in its input, subject only to the constraint of individual rationality. What happens if this is weakened to the requirement that it should cope only with those input pro…les that exhibit a certain amount of cohe- Notice that the majority judgments in Table 2 coincide with the judgments of the median individual relative to the left-right alignment, here individual 3. Generally, given any pro…le of the form described, no proposition can be supported by a majority unless it is also supported by the median individual. So, by deferring to the majority, individuals inherit the consistent judgments of the median individual. 
Relaxing rational co-domain
Rational co-domain requires the individuals'output judgment sets to be both consistent and complete. Suppose this is weakened to the requirement that output judgment sets be merely consistent and deductively closed, where deductive closure means that individuals accept the implications of other accepted propositions, at least when they are also contained in the agenda.
Deductive closure is much less demanding than completeness, as it is satis…ed, for example, even by an empty judgment set. Requiring deductive closure in a deliberative setting is plausible (at least when con…ned to propositions on the agenda) because a frequently stated aim of deliberation is not just to lead people to form considered judgments on various propositions but also to make them aware of the implications of their judgments. 
What happens if rational co-domain is relaxed in this way

Relaxing unanimity preservation
Unanimity preservation is the requirement that the transformation function map any unanimous pro…le to itself. Relaxing this requirement is not a very promising route. First, the requirement is already very mild, as argued above. But, secondly, even if one were prepared to drop it, this would not lead very far: under slightly stronger assumptions about how the propositions 22 The result still holds if the transformation function admits as input any possible pro…le of consistent and deductively closed judgment sets (not requiring completeness); here even a weakened independence/systematicity condition su¢ ces for the result (Dietrich and List 2006) . For an equivalent result in abstract aggregation, see Dokow and Holzman (2006) .
on the agenda are interconnected, Theorem 2 continues to hold even without unanimity preservation. 23 I therefore set this route aside here.
Relaxing minimal relevance
Minimal relevance rules out that an individual's pre-deliberation judgment set never makes any di¤erence to his or her post-deliberation judgment set.
As in the case of unanimity preservation, relaxing minimal relevance does not lead to a strong escape route from the impossibility theorem. Not only is minimal relevance a mild requirement, but, as shown in the proof of Theorem 
Relaxing independence/systematicity
Independence requires the transformation function to determine the output judgment on any proposition solely on the basis of the individuals' input judgments on that proposition, with systematicity requiring in addition that 23 If systematicity is required, the relevant agenda assumption is the conjunction of (i),
(ii) and a property called asymmetry; this follows from a result by Dietrich (forthcoming).
If only independence is required, the relevant agenda assumption is atomic closure or atomicity; this follows from results by Pauly and van Hees (2006) and Dietrich (2006) . the pattern of dependence be the same across propositions. As noted above, this can be viewed as a constraint of 'local'deliberation, requiring the consideration of one proposition at a time. Given the limited appeal of the previous escape routes from the impossibility result, it seems natural to relax this requirement.
If we give it up, one possibility is for each individual to designate some propositions on the agenda as 'premises' and others as 'conclusions' and to generate his or her post-deliberation judgments by deferring to the predeliberation majority judgment on each premise and then deriving the judgments on other propositions from these majority judgments on the premises.
If the premises are chosen as a 'logical basis'for the entire agenda -that is, 
Away from consensus
While it is sometimes held that group deliberation should bring about consensus, there is very little empirical evidence of this e¤ect. It is also unclear whether achieving consensus is always normatively desirable. Moreover, if
we impose unanimity generation as a condition on a transformation function, then the problem of judgment transformation formally collapses into that of judgment aggregation, and the only transformation functions satisfying universal domain, rational co-domain, unanimity preservation and independence/systematicity -dropping minimal relevance -are those opinion leader functions in which all individuals defer to the same opinion leader, the equivalent of an Arrowian dictator. This is particularly ironic in so far as the possibility of a deliberation-induced consensus is often proposed as a solution to, not a variant of, the notorious problem of aggregation.
Could deliberation bring about something less than consensus that is still helpful for democratic decision-making -for example, by facilitating the consistent aggregation of post-deliberation judgments?
A recent literature suggests that deliberation may have this e¤ect, at least under favourable conditions (Miller 1992 , Knight and Johnson 1994 , Dryzek and List 2003 . Recall the earlier discussion of the possibility that individuals agree on some cognitive or ideological dimension in terms of which to think about the relevant propositions or, in the case of ranking judgments, the candidates or policy options. While such 'meta-agreement'may be too demanding as a pre-condition for deliberation, it can more plausibly be expected as the outcome of deliberation. In an empirical study using data from Fishkin's deliberative polls (List, Luskin, Fishkin and McLean 2000/2006) , such an e¤ect has been identi…ed. Groups of between 150 and 350 randomly sampled participants were interviewed on their ranking judgments over multiple policy options both before and after a period of group deliberation.
Deliberation increased the proximity of these ranking judgments to singlepeakedness, as de…ned above -a deliberation-induced movement towards 'meta-agreement'. induced opinion change observed in deliberative polls and other experiments.
To the best of my knowledge, however, the present approach is the …rst attempt to model a deliberation-induced 'meta-agreement'formally.
From a normative perspective, further questions need to be asked on whether a suitable constrained minimal revision function captures the requirements of a good deliberative process as discussed in the literature on deliberative democracy. A constrained minimal revision function satis…es universal domain, rational co-domain, unanimity preservation and minimal relevance, while violating independence/systematicity, but does it also satisfy some other desiderata of good deliberation?
Obviously, it does not satisfy unanimity generation, except when the focusing function picks out only one admissible output judgment set for each input pro…le. What about other conditions? As already illustrated, a constrained minimal revision function may satisfy cohesion generation, where a pro…le is de…ned to be cohesive if it generates consistent majority judgments. Cohesion generation is a particularly appealing condition when the deliberative process is expected to lead to a democratic decision.
Another condition is stability under repeated rounds of deliberation, the requirement that the transformation function map any output pro…le (that is, any pro…le in the function's range) to itself, or equivalently, that repeated applications of the function lead to the same output as a single application. Any transformation function satisfying both unanimity preservation and unanimity generation also satis…es this condition, because its …rst application leads to unanimity and subsequent applications preserve this unanimity. By contrast, if the members of a group sit around a circular table and each individual defers to his or her neighbour on the right in forming post-deliberation judgments, then the resulting transformation function -a special kind of opinion leader function -violates the stability condition, as each round of deliberation yields a further permutation of the given pro-…le across individuals. A constrained minimal revision function, however, is stable under repeated rounds of deliberation so long as the group's focusing function and the individuals'distance metrics are su¢ ciently well-behaved.
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Whether stability under repeated rounds of deliberation is a plausible requirement depends on how the judgment transformation function is interpreted. If it is meant to capture opinion change in a single round of deliberation, then there is no reason to expect subsequent rounds of deliberation to leave opinions …xed. But if it is meant to capture a complete deliberative process up to the point of 're ‡ective equilibrium' (Rawls 1971) , then the stability condition is plausible -arguably more so than consensus generation.
8 Conclusion This observation suggests that realistic deliberative processes must exhibit a certain kind of holism: Individuals cannot form their post-deliberation judgments on each proposition based on pre-deliberation judgments on that proposition alone, but must take into account pre-deliberation judgments on other propositions too. This holistic property of group deliberation is anal- 26 The focusing function must have the property that it maps any output pro…le constructed from any set of judgment sets in its range to a new set of judgment sets that still contains all the judgment sets in the given output pro…le. The distance metric must have the standard property that the distance of any judgment set from itself is uniquely zero.
ogous to the holistic property of theory testing in science. According to the Duhem-Quine 'holism'thesis in the philosophy of science (Quine 1951) , one cannot generally test a single proposition in isolation, but only in conjunction with other propositions in a larger web of beliefs.
Let me conclude with some remarks about how the present approach is related to game-theoretic approaches to studying deliberation. While gametheoretic approaches seek to come up with a behavioural theory of group deliberation, analysing individuals'incentives in deliberation and predicting their behaviour on that basis, the goal of the present approach is to illuminate the logical space of possible functional relations between pre-and post-deliberation judgments. The present approach is thus more akin to
Arrowian social choice theory than to game theory, and the relationship between the two approaches is similar to that between social choice theory and the theory of mechanism design. The former investigates possible functional relations between individual preferences and social decisions and the latter investigates the various mechanisms available (or unavailable) for implementing these functional relations under certain incentive constraints. Therefore I see the present approach as complementary to game-theoretic approaches, not as competitive.
In addition, there are important bridges between the two approaches.
As already noted, the condition of independence can be motivated gametheoretically, namely as a necessary condition (under certain assumptions)
for the incentive-compatibility of truthfulness in deliberation. Thus my conclusion that realistic deliberative processes are likely to violate independence reinforces a central question in game-theoretic work on deliberation (e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks 2006): How can we design deliberative processes that induce participants to reveal their judgments truthfully?
Broadly, there are at least two approaches towards this question. One may either go along the mechanism-design route and ask what deliberative processes
